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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A R T H U R W. D E C K E R , \ 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. 
T H E I N D U S T R I A L COMMIS-
SION O F U T A H D E P A R T M E N T 
OF E M P L O Y M E N T S E C U R I T Y , 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is a review by the Utah Supreme Court of 
the decision of the Utah Board of Review of August 
27, 1974, which affirmed the decision of the Appeals 
Referee of May 28, 1974, denying unemployment bene-
fits to the plaintiff for the 52 weeks commencing with 
the week ended August 19, 1972, and requiring repay-
ment of $2,229.00 in benefits received during the dis-
qualification period, on the grounds that when filing 
claims for unemployment benefits for the weeks ended 
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ingly failed to report material facts about work and 
earnings in order to obtain unemployment benefits. The 
decision of the appeals referee had affirmed a determin-
ation of J u l y 3, 1973, by the Depar tment of Employ-
ment Security, Industrial Commission of Utah, assess-
ing the foregoing disqualification and repayment re-
quirement. 
The basis for the disqualification was Section 35-4-
5 ( e ) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
A n individual shall be ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(e) F o r the week with respect to which he had 
wilfully made a false statement or representation 
or knowingly failed to report a material fact to 
obtain any benefit under the provisions of this 
act, and for the 51-week period immediately fol-
lowing and until he has repaid to the fund all 
monies he received by reason of his fraud and 
which he received during such following 51-week 
disqualification period . . . 
Section 35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
further provides, 
A n y person who, by reason of his fraud, has re-
ceived any sum as benefits under this act to which 
he was not entitled shall be liable to repay such 
sum to the commission for the fund . . . 
Plaintiff contends that the Commission determin-
ations are not supported by sufficient evidence in the 
record and that the statutory disqualification and re-
2 
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payment requirement are in violation of his constitution-
al rights of substantive due process. Defendant con-
tends that the determinations are amply supported upon 
substantial competent evidence and even clear and con-
vincing evidence in the record and that the statutory 
disqualification and repayment requirements are clearly 
well within the valid and proper constitutional exercise 
of the police power of the State. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission deter-
minxations or, alternatively, a remand and rehearing. 
Defendant seeks affirmation of such determinations. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Plaintiff initiated an interstate claim for unem-
ployment benefits against Utah from Arizona on May 
5, 1972. His benefit amount was determined to be 
$77.00 per week for a potential maximum duration of 
36 weeks. Plaintiff is a high school graduate with two 
quarters of college training. H e had experience in filing 
claims for unemployment benefits in May 1972, and 
again in July 1972, before filing the claims at issue 
in this case for August 1972. 
On September 15 1972, the plaintiff filed a claim 
form (R. 50) for unemployment benefits for the weeks 
ended August 19, 1972, andAugust 26, 1972. In re-
sponse to the question "During the week(s) claimed in 
3 
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No. 7 and No. 8 above, did you work or earn wages 
of any kind?" the plaintiff marked the answer "No". 
The form further instructed that as to any work per-
formed the claimant show the date of such work, em-
ployer name and address, daily pay, number of hours 
worked, and reason for separation, if any. The plaintiff 
made no entry in any of these spaces. 
The plaintiff worked for H . & R. Transfer and 
Storage Co. of Phoenix, Arizona, during the week 
ended August 19,1972, earning $97.13. H e also worked 
for this company during the week ended August 26, 
1972, and earned $190.33. Payments for both weeks 
of work were made to the plaintiff by August 30, 1972. 
The plaintiff worked briefly for a different em-
ployer during the week ended September 2, 1972, earn-
ing $16.00 which he properly reported on September 5, 
1972, upon his claim form for that week together with 
the complete information as to the date, name and ad-
dress of employer, daily pay, and hours worked (R. 59). 
As a result of information obtained from H . & R. 
Transfer and Storage Company the plaintiff was con-
fronted about his failure to make any report about his 
work or earnings, etc., for the weeks ended August 19 
and August 26, 1972. On the basis of such failure, the 
plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment 
benefits for the week ended August 19, 1972, and the 
51 following weeks and thereafter until he repays to the 
fund the amount of $2,229.00 in benefits wrongly re-
ceived during the disqualification period. 
4 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E D I S Q U A L I F I C A T I O N A N D R E -
P A Y M E N T R E Q U I R E M E N T S W E R E P R O P -
E R L Y A S S E S S E D U P O N T H E E V I D E N C E 
T H A T T H E P L A I N T I F F A C T E D KNOW-
I N G L Y IN F A I L I N G TO R E P O R T H I S 
W O R K OR E A R N I N G S W H I L E C L A I M I N G 
U N E M P L O Y M E N T B E N E F I T S . 
The defendant recognizes, as did the plaintiff, that 
a proper application of the disqualification and repay-
ment determinations in this case requires an affirmation 
of the finding upon the record that the plaintiff know-
ingly failed to report material facts as to work or earn-
ings in order to obtain unemployment benefits. 
This Court has made no specific declaration under 
Section 35-4-5 (e) of the Employment Security Act as 
to the balance of evidence necessary to support Indus-
trial Commission findings. However, the Court has, on 
many occasions declared its requirement to uphold the 
Commission findings and decision if there is substantial 
evidence to sustain these. Members of Ironworkers 
Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 U. 242, 
139 P . 2d 208 (1943); Martinez v. Board of Review, 
Department of Employment Security, 25 U. 2d 131, 
477 P . 2d 587 (1970). 
The Employment Security Act itself, 35-4-10(1), 
U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
5 
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. . . In any judicial proceeding under this section 
the findings of the commission and board of re-
view as to the facts if supported by evidence shall 
be conclusive . . . 
In Gocke v. Weisley, 18 U. 2d 245, 249, 420 P . 2d 
44, 46, (1966), the court stated that a reversal of an 
order denying compensation can only be justified if 
there be no substantial evidence to sustain the determin-
ation, and there is proof of facts giving rise to the right 
of compensation so clear and persuasive that the refusal 
to accept and make an award was clearly capricious, 
arbitrary and unreasonable. In Kennecott Copper 
Corp. Emp. v. Department of Employment Security, 
13 U. 2d 262, 264, 372 P . 2d 987 (1962), the court said: 
. . . the evidence is to be looked at in the light 
most favorable to the findings; and in so doing, 
if there is evidence of any substance whatever 
which can reasonably be regarded as supporting 
the determination made, it must be affirmed . . . 
While the applicable standard of review is, no 
doubt, as cited above, the defendant contends that not 
only is there substantial evidence in support of the 
Commission's finding upon the record, but there is also 
amply "clear and convincing" evidence to support the 
Commission determination. 
This Court has defined clear and convincing evi-
dence to be such that there is "no serious or substantial 
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion." Greener 
v. Greener, 116 U. 571, 212 P . 2d 194 (1949); North-
crest, Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 122 U. 268, 
6 
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248 P . 2d 692, 298 (1952); Kirchgestner v. Denver and 
R. G.W. R. Co., 118 U. 41, 233 P . 2d 699 (1951); 
Poulsen v. Coombs, 123 U. 49, 253 P . 2d 621 (1953). 
In the Greener case, the Court noted: "The evidence 
. . . satisfied the mind of the trial court. His finding 
should not be disturbed unless we must say that no one 
could find the evidence clear and convincing. This does 
not appear to be the case." 
The plaintiff concedes the materiality of the facts 
about work and earnings omitted by him in filing his 
claim for unemployment benefits. The principle thrust 
of plaintiff's contention, therefore, appears to be that 
he was confused by not knowing how to report work 
and earnings, the plaintiff asserting by way of argument 
that he was not sure of the exact amount of the earnings. 
However, the fact of the matter, as shown below by 
reference to the plaintiff's own testimony, is that the 
plaintiff did not report either work or earnings although 
he well knew that he had worked and had had substan-
tial earnings ($287.46). Neither did he correct his fail-
ure by reporting later when, as he admits, he had been 
fully paid. Further, the plaintiff made no report about 
the identity of his employer or other information about 
the work although this information was called for on 
the claims form and was known to him at the time he 
completed the form. 
The argument about not being certain, as to the 
amount of earnings is a familiar one used to attempt to 
excuse fraudulent claims, hence the additional require-
ments to report hours worked and identity of employer 
7 
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(see R. 50), material facts always known to a claimant 
by the time any work is performed. 
Without the need for reference to documents chal-
lenged by plaintiff's counsel as hearsay, the record fully 
affirms the plaintiff's understanding of the claims 
forms, processes, and reporting requirements: he is a 
high school graduate with two quarters of college (R. 
37) ; he had experience in filing claims during May, 1972, 
and subsequently during July, 1972, prior to the claims 
at issue filed for August, 1972, (R. 30-31); he had been 
cautioned as to the need for care and thoroughness in 
making out his claim forms (R. 29); the claims form 
called for a report of work or earnings of any kind, in-
cluding the date, employer, daily pay, and hours worked, 
etc. (R. 50) ; the plaintiff knew at the time of filing the 
claim form for the weeks ended August 19 and August 
26, 1972, that he had just worked many hours for H . & 
R. Transfer Company (R. 32), that his earnings were 
"around $4.00" per hour (R. 32), and that such work 
had been in the immediately preceding ten-day period 
(R. 38). 
I t is clear, further, that the plaintiff admitted know-
ing that his work was during the same ten-day period 
as that to which the claim form applied (R. 38), and 
that in response to the question as to whether he had 
worked he answered "No" when he should have an-
swered "Yes" (R. 39). 
In addition, the record confirms that although the 
plaintiff allegedly delayed reporting about his work 
8 
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because of uncertainty as to the amount of earnings, he 
did not subsequently report the work when his exact 
earnings were known to him (R. 36, R. 39, R. 40, R. 
42), this despite the fact that he reported carefully and 
correctly just a few days later the small amount of 
$16.00 earned elsewhere (R. 39), showing fully the 
date worked, name and address of the employer, amount 
earned, and number of hours worked (R. 59). I t should 
be noted that the report of $16.00 had only nominal 
effect upon his benefits whereas the larger earnings, un-
reported by the plaintiff, would have temporarily dis-
placed his unemployment benefits. 
In addition to all of the foregoing, the record also 
affirms by personal testimony, the established procedure 
followed in Arizona at the time in question to instruct 
claimants to report all work whether yet paid or not 
and shows that such aid was extended, when necessary, 
even to having a claims worker telephone the employer 
in order to help the claimant report correctly (R. 26). 
Of course such help could not be given in this case be-
cause the claimant did not divulge anything about the 
work performed. 
The foregoing evidence from the plaintiff's own 
testimony, the testimony of the claims worker, and the 
acknowledged claims documents submitted by the plain-
tiff leave no doubt as to his knowing failure to report 
.material- facts about his work and earnings in order, 
wrongly, to obtain unemployment benefits. 
9 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E D I S Q U A L I F I C A T I O N A N D RE-
P A Y M E N T R E Q U I R E M E N T S OF T H E 
UTAH; E M P L O Y M E N T S E C U R I T Y ACT A R E 
A P R O P E R E X E R C I S E OF T H E P O L I C E 
P O W E R OF T H E S T A T E A N D A R E W H O L -
L Y I N ACCORD W I T H D U E PROCESS R E -
Q U I R E M E N T S OF T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S 
C O N S T I T U T I O N . 
The plaintiff's contentions on appeal are essentially 
alternative, i.e., (1) that the claimant did not knowingly 
fail to report about his work or earnings, and that (2) 
even if he did, the legislative requirement for disqualifi-
cation for unemployment benefits is a penalty in excess 
of the police power of the State and hence a violation 
of substantive due process guarantees of the United 
States Constitution. 
I t is, of course, clear that there are substantive due 
process limits upon State police power. Jt is equally 
clear, however, that they are not transcended or even 
closely approached by the disqualification at issue in 
this case. In general, Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess requirements do not operate as a limitation upon 
the police power of the state to pass and enforce such 
reasonable laws as will inure to the health, morals, and 
general welfare of the people. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d 
Constitutional Law § 296 and numerous cases cited 
therein, p. 478, note 15, including State v. Mason, 94 U. 
10 
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501, 78 P . 2d 920, 117 A L R 330 (1938) and Bountiful 
City v. DeLuca, 77 U. 107, 292 P . 194, 72 A L R 657 
(1930). 
The national scheme of unemployment insurance 
under respective state laws has, accordingly, been up-
held in its beneficent purposes despite the application 
therein of various disqualifications and penalties. Charles 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 
883, 81 L. Ed. 1279, (1937). Similarly, the constitu-
tionality of the Utah unemployment insurance act as a 
proper exercise of the State police power has also been 
upheld by this Court. Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 98 U. 48, 97 P . 2d 582 (1939); 
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
Department of Placement and Unemployment Insur-
ance, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479, rehearing denied 104 
U. 196,141 P. 2d 694 (1943). 
I t is further well established that the proper ex-
ercise of the State police power extends not only to 
enactments necessary for preservation of health and 
safety, etc., but also to the prevention of fraud, deceit, 
cheating, and imposition. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional 
Law § 312, and cases cited therein, p. 609, note 12. 
The various state unemployment insurance laws all 
(except Iowa) contain repayment requirements and dis^ 
qualification provisions for material false representa-
tions or omissions made in filing claims for unemploy-
ment benefits. Iowa provides for criminal sanctions 
only. Most state provisions, like those in Utah, dis-
U 
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qualify up to 52 weeks for material omissions or mis-
representations and require repayment of all benefits 
received during the disqualification period. Comparison 
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Manpower Administration, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Service, p. 4-13 (Rev. September 
1974). 
The validity of these provisions has been uniformly 
upheld and they have been applied in numerous de-
cisions by the highest courts of the respective states. 
Representative of numerous cases in New York is 
that of Lack v. Catkerwood, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 550, 31 A.D. 
663 (1968), in which the Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division upheld the requirement that the claimant re-
pay $1,300 in benefits wrongly received by reason of 
her misrepresentation (failure to report work in family 
business for husband) and also affirmed the prospective 
application of an additional 52-week disqualification as 
to future unemployment benefits. 
In Marlow v. Bureau of Unemployment Compen-
sation, 4 Ohio App. 2d 299, 212 N.E. 2d 632 (1965), 
the Ohio court upheld the indefinite disqualification of 
the claimant for a false statement in his application for 
unemployment benefits (falsely representing married 
status to obtain $5 weekly dependent's allowance) and 
required that he repay $1,128 to the unemployment in-
surance fund, such amount representing both the 
wrongly obtained dependent's allowance and all other 
benefits received. 
12 
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The Supreme Court of Washington in Allen v. 
Employment Security Department, 83 Wash. 2d 145, 
516 P . 2d 1032 (1973), upheld the 26 week disqualifica-
tion of the claimant for misrepresentation of his reason 
for separation when filing his claim for unemployment 
benefits. 
In Industrial Commission v. Bennett, 1 66 Colo, 
101, 411 P.2d 648 (1968), the claimant's knowing fail-
ure to report school attendance on her claim for unem-
ployment benefits was upheld by the Colorado Supreme 
Court as a basis for disqualifying her for benefits for 
52 weeks. 
In Miranda v. Beaman, 95 Ariz. 388, 391 P . 2d 555 
(1964), the Arizona court upheld the Employment 
Security Commission, rejecting the credibility of the 
claimant's assertion that he did not understand about 
reporting his earning^and applying a disqualification 
of 24 weeks for his failure to report. In that case, the 
plaintiff-claimant had reported some of his earnings for 
the week in question ($17.44) but had not reported the 
entire amount earned ($52.32). In addition, he reported 
"no" earnings for a subsequent week in which he had 
actually earned $34.88. 
The foregoing cases illustrate^unequivocal manner 
in which the high courts have upheld sanctions against 
unemployment insurance frauds and have supported leg-
islative enactments imposing disqualifications under 
the police power. 
13 
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The defendant urges, in summary, that the auth-
ority of the state to so act is well and thoroughly estab-
lished and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is ample with credible evidence, clear 
and convincing, that in filing claims for unemployment 
benefits for the weeks ended August 19 and August 26, 
1972, the plaintiff did knowingly fail to report material 
facts about his work and earnings in order to obtain 
benefits to which he was not entitled. I t is further clear 
that the disqualification under Section 35-4-5 (e), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, is a valid and proper exercise of 
the police power of the state; that the disqualification of 
the plaintiff thereunder for the 52-week period com-
mencing with the week ended August 19, 1972, was 
properly applied; and that the plaintiff is liable to re-
pay the $2,229 wrongly received in unemployment bene-
fits during the disqualification period. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E D G A R M. D E N N Y 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
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